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Abstract 
In economics, risk lovers have been generally ignored, most likely because it has generally been 
thought that they cannot survive economically. In this paper, I examine the possibility that risk 
lovers can exist continuously in the framework of an economic growth model. A bubble-like 
phenomenon (a so-called “bubble economy”) can be generated if risk lovers undertake a very 
risky financial “bluff”—for example, if they purposely raise some important asset prices. I 
conclude that because risk-loving and risk-averse households can coexist at a state of sustainable 
heterogeneity, risk lovers can exist continuously in an economy. Therefore, it is likely that a bluff 
will be undertaken by risk lovers and a bubble-like phenomenon can be generated. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Theoretically, a rational bubble cannot exist if agents have infinite horizons (Blanchard and 
Watson, 1982; Santos and Woodford, 1997). An assumption of some kind of irrationality may 
therefore be necessary to explain the existence of bubble-like phenomena (so-called “bubble 
economies”) that have actually been observed in many countries. On the other hand, Harashima 
(2015) showed that a bubble-like phenomenon can be generated rationally if a financial “bluff” 
is undertaken—that is, if private information about the rate of time preference of the 
representative household (RTP RH) is utilized. A bluff provides a tremendous payoff to the 
bluffer if it succeeds, but it is very risky. Hence, ordinary risk-averse people will not bluff. Risk 
lovers are needed for a bluff to be undertaken.  
 In conventional economic growth models, however, if the relative degree of risk 
aversion of a household is negative (i.e., the household is a risk lover), its consumption steadily 
declines to zero, and the household ceases to exist. Hence, the common belief has been that even 
if risk lovers exist at some point, they will not exist continuously. As a result, there have been few 
economic studies of risk lovers, and the economic influences of risk lovers have generally been 
ignored. Exceptionally, Crainich et al. (2013), Jindapon (2013), and Jindapon and Whaley (2015) 
explicitly studied risk lovers. Jindapon and Whaley (2015) showed that an equilibrium exists in a 
rent-seeking game when players are risk loving and imprudent, but this result is generated only 
in some rent-seeking games. Crainich et al. (2013) showed that mixed risk lovers are prudent in 
the framework of a binary lottery, but Ebert (2013) criticized the study and said that a more careful 
treatment of the issue was needed. The common problem of these studies is that risk lovers are 
studied in very narrow environments, such as rent-seeking games or a binary lottery. In this paper, 
the possibility that risk lovers can exist continuously in an economy is examined in the framework 
of an economic growth model.  
 Here, the existence of risk lovers is examined on the basis of the concept of sustainable 
heterogeneity shown by Harashima (2010, 2017) and is defined as the state at which all the 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. Sustainable 
heterogeneity therefore means an economically harmonious coexistence of heterogeneous 
households. If risk-loving and risk-averse households can coexist at this state, risk lovers can exist 
continuously and therefore can bluff. I examine this possibility and conclude that risk lovers can 
exist indefinitely at the state of sustainable heterogeneity, and therefore, it is likely that a bluff 
will be undertaken by risk lovers and a bubble-like phenomenon can be generated.  
 
2  BUBBLES, BLUFFS, AND RISK LOVERS 
 
2.1  The bluff mechanism  
2.1.1  Bubbles and bluffs 
Harashima (2014a) showed that each household must expect RTP RH ex ante for it to behave 
optimally. Nevertheless, a household cannot directly observe the intrinsic RTP RH although it 
knows its own intrinsic rate of time preference, and therefore the expected RTP RH has to be 
generated. As a result, the economy is subject not to the intrinsic RTP RH but to the expected RTP 
RH. However, there is a problem with this approach. Even if the expected RTP RH is actually 
very different from the intrinsic RTP RH, the economy will appear to proceed quite “normally” 
for an indefinite period of time without any inconsistencies among observed economic indicators. 
Hence, the observed economic indicators alone cannot tell us whether the expected RTP RH is 
truly identical to the intrinsic RTP RH or whether or not the current economy is in a bubble-like 
state. Because of this nature, the expected RTP RH is intrinsically fragile (see Harashima, 2014b). 
 The fragility of the expected RTP RH indicates that there is room for an agent (probably 
a malicious one) to manipulate the expected RTP RH, for example, by intentionally disseminating 
misleading information. By manipulating the expected RTP RH, the economy can also be 
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influenced. For example, the expected RTP RH may be manipulated by injecting huge amounts 
of money into financial markets and purposely raising some important asset prices, and if the 
manipulation succeeds, a bubble-like phenomenon may be generated. I call this manipulation of 
the expected RTP RH a “bluff.” More correctly, a bluff herein is defined as the behavior of an 
agent who pretends to possess information (which is actually false) that the intrinsic RTP RH has 
changed. If the expected RTP RH is manipulated well (i.e., the bluff succeeds), the bluffer can 
obtain a huge payout. 
 
2.1.2  The bluff model  
This section presents a brief explanation of Harashima’s (2015) bluff model, which is used as a 
basis for the examination in this paper. Suppose for simplicity that all bluffers are identical and, 
therefore, bluffers’ actions (bluffs) are represented by a representative bluffer (hereafter, “the 
bluffer”). Let π be the subjective payoffs of a bluff to the bluffer if the expected RTP RH is 
successfully manipulated. Let p ( 10  p ) be the probability that, after observing the 
information the bluffer disseminated, households decide that the expected RTP RH has changed. 
Because bluffs are very risky, p is very low. If households do not believe the information and do 
not change the expected RTP RH, the bluff fails and the bluffer suffers the loss – π where
ππ 0 . It is assumed for simplicity thatπ is identical for any bluff andπ is also identical for 
any bluff. 
 The expected payoff to the bluffer (Π) for a bluff is therefore 
 
  πpπpΠ  1  
   πππp                                 (1) 
 
Equation (1) indicates that, even if p is very low, Π > 0 ifπ is sufficiently large. The variance of 
Π, σ2, is  
 
    222 ππppσ   .                          (2) 
 
Because 10  p , then 02  pp , 02 σ , 
 
      022
2
 ππpp
πd
dσ
 , 
 
and 
  
    02 2
2
22
 pp
πd
σd
 . 
 
In addition, because 10  p , 
 
   012
2
 ππp
dΠ
dσ
 
 
and 
 
    012 1
2
22
 p
dΠ
σd
 . 
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2.2  Need for risk lovers 
Because p is very low, bluffs are very risky. By equations (1) and (2), a bluff payoff curve can be 
drawn as the bold line on the Π–σ2 plane in Figure 1. Here, it is assumed for simplicity that, in 
every period, the chances of a bluff being undertaken at any point on the payoff curve occur 
randomly. The payoff curve breaks off at point A because p is very low and a higher σ2 indicates 
a higher p if p is very low, as indicated by equation (2). This means that all bluffs have a very low 
p. Suppose for simplicity that investment opportunities are limited to either a bluff or a risk-free 
asset. Letπ~ be the payoffs of a risk-free asset. Suppose also that the value of Π at any point on the 
payoff curve is smaller thanπ~ because a bluff is very risky and p is very low, even thoughπ is 
large.  
 
Figure 1: Payoff curve for a bluff undertaken by a risk lover 
 
Π 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        0                                                              σ2 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The other curves in Figure 1 indicate the indifference curves of risk-averse, risk-neutral, 
and risk-loving persons. Three of the curves pass through point (π~ , 0) where point (x, y) indicates 
the point for Π = x and σ2 = y. The indifference curves of risk-averse and risk-neutral persons that 
pass through point (π~ , 0) do not intersect the payoff curve, and therefore those persons will never 
undertake a bluff and instead invest in the risk-free asset. On the other hand, the indifference 
curve of a risk-loving person that passes through point (π~ , 0) intersects the payoff curve, so the 
risk-loving person will undertake a bluff. Furthermore, the indifference curve that passes through 
π~  
Indifference curve of a risk-averse 
person that passes through point (π~ , 0) 
Indifference curve of a risk-neutral 
person that passes through point (π~ , 0) 
Indifference curve of a risk-loving 
person that passes through point A 
Indifference curve of a risk-loving 
person that passes through point (π~ , 0) 
A 
Bluff payoff curve 
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point A indicates a higher level of utility than the indifference curve that passes through point (π~ , 
0) for the risk-loving person, and thereby the bluff corresponding to point A will be undertaken 
by the risk-loving person.  
 An important point is that the payoff (Π) at point A is lower thanπ~ . This means that 
even if the bluff payoff is lower than that of a risk-free asset, a risk-loving person still undertakes 
the bluff. Furthermore, even if the expected payoff of the bluff is negative, some risk lovers will 
undertake bluffs because the bluffs still give them a higher level of utility than investing in a risk-
free asset. This situation is shown in Figure 2, in which point B gives a higher utility to the risk-
loving person than point (π~ , 0). The reason for this behavior is that risk lovers enjoy risk and 
obtain utility from risk itself. For some risk lovers, the thrill and enthusiasm they feel from taking 
a risk overwhelms any worries about likely negative consequences. Therefore, if risk lovers exist, 
they will bluff even though it is very risky, and furthermore, even if its expected payoffs are 
negative.  
 
Figure 2: A bluff with negative payoffs undertaken by a risk lover 
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  0                                                              σ2 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
π~  
Indifference curve of a risk-loving 
person that passes through point B 
B 
Bluff payoff curve 
Indifference curve of a risk-loving 
person that passes through point (π~ , 0) 
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2.3  Can risk lovers survive economically? 
As shown in Section 2.2, for a bluff to be undertaken, risk lovers must exist in an economy; 
moreover, a sufficiently large number of risk lovers is necessary. A bluff requires a large amount 
of funds, and a single risk lover’s funds will usually be limited. The funds of many risk lovers 
may have to be pooled consciously or unconsciously to make a bluff succeed. This means that a 
sufficiently large number of risk lovers needs to exist for a bluff to be undertaken. However, as 
noted in the Introduction, conventional economic theory teaches us that consumption by risk 
lovers will steadily decline to zero and that they will disappear from the economy. How, then, can 
so many risk lovers exist continuously in an economy?   
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
In this section, before examining the survivability of risk lovers, I briefly explain Harashima’s 
(2010, 2017) concept of sustainable heterogeneity. Sustainable heterogeneity is defined as the 
state at which all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied 
indefinitely. If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, risk-averse and risk-loving households can 
coexist indefinitely, with both satisfying all of their optimality conditions. 
 
3.1  The model 
Three heterogeneities―time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are considered. First, 
suppose that there are two economies―economy 1 and economy 2—that are identical except for 
time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The economies are fully open to each other, and 
goods, services, and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each 
economy. Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used only for international transactions. 
However, because both national and international interpretations are possible, this concept and 
the related terminology are also used for the national models presented in this paper. 
 The degree of risk aversion (DRA) of economy 1 is
'u
"uc
ε
,t
1
11
1  and that of economy 2 
is
'u
"uc
ε
,t
2
22
2  , both of which are constant, where ui and ci,t, respectively, are the utility function 
and per capita consumption of economy i (i = 1, 2) in period t. The rate of time preference (RTP) 
of economy 1 is
1θ and that in economy 2 is 2θ . The production function of economy 1 is
 ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 111   and that of economy 2 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 222  , where yi,t and ki,t, respectively, are 
per capita output and capital of economy i in period t. At is technology in period t, α is a constant 
(0 < α < 1), and  10 11  ωω and  10 22  ωω are constants. The production functions are 
further specified as α
ti,
α
t
α
ii,t kAωy
 1 . The current account balance in economy 1 is tτ and that in 
economy 2 is 
tτ . The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows 
between the two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the 
other economy. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the economies, 
the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  ,t,tt ,kkgτ 21  . 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
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subject to 
 
1
,1,1
0
,2
,2
,1,1
2










 
t
ttt
t
s
t
t
tt
L
Aνcτdsτ
k
y
yk   ,             (3) 
 
and that in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,2,2
0
,1
,1
,2,2
2










 
t
ttt
t
s
t
t
tt
L
Aνcτdsτ
k
y
yk   ,             (4) 
 
where E is the expectation operator, v (> 0) is a constant, and
tiA ,
 is the increase in At by research 
and development activities in economy i in period t and
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . 
 
3.2  Sustainable heterogeneity in the heterogeneous risk 
aversion model 
Suppose that θθθ  21 and ωωω  21 ; that is, only risk aversion is heterogeneous between 
economies 1 and 2, and
21 εε  . In this model, if, and only if, 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim



t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim

constant, all 
the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied at steady state; that is, sustainable 
heterogeneity is achieved (see Harashima, 2010, 2017), and  
 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlimlimlimlim





 
           
t
t
t y
y
,1
,1
lim



t
t
t y
y
,2
,2
lim





t
lim
t
t
A
A
= constant. 
 
Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved on this path, which is called the multilateral path. The limit 
of the growth rate on the multilateral path is  
 


,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
c
c
2
2
1
1 limlim

 



















  

θα
mν
αεε α
α
1
2
1
21                   (5) 
 
where m (> 0) and  1 are constants. In addition, on the multilateral path,  
 
  
t
t
t k
τ
,1
lim

 = 
t
t
t k
τ
,2
lim

 = Ξ  , 
 
where Ξ is a constant, and  
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   
     




























 


























11
2
1
1
1
211
21
21
θα
mν
αεε
α
mν
α
εε
θα
mν
α
εε
Ξ
α
α
α
α
α
α


 . 
 
Furthermore, if  
2
11 21
1 εε
α
mν
α
θ
α
α











, 
 
0Ξ  
 
(see Harashima, 2010, 2017). The condition  
2
11 21
1 εε
α
mν
α
θ
α
α











is generally satisfied for 
reasonable parameter values. 
 This two-economy model can be extended to a multi-economy model. Suppose that H 
economies are identical except for risk aversion, and the DRA of economy i is εi (i = 1, 2, … , H). 
In this case, if and only if  
 
 
































θα
mν
α
H
ε
c
c α
α
H
q
q
ti,
ti,
t
1lim
1
1                     (6) 
 
for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady state, 
and 
 




t
sji
t
sji
t
tji
tji
t
t
t
t
ti
ti
t
ti
ti
t
ti
ti
t
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
A
A
y
y
k
k
c
c
0
,,
0
,,
,,
,,
,
,
,
,
,
, limlimlimlimlimlim

 
 
for any i and j (i ≠ j). In this case, H economies can be seen as a combined economy with a 
DRA of 


H
q
qεH
1
1 , and the combined economy proceeds on the multilateral path.  
 
3.3  Unilateral path 
If each economy behaves unilaterally in the sense that it sets
tτ without regard for the other 
economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality conditions of all economies cannot be 
satisfied (see Harashima, 2010, 2017). This path is called the unilateral path, and heterogeneity is 
not sustainable on this path. Becker (1980) showed that, if the time preference is heterogeneous, 
the most patient household will eventually own all capital and substantial inequality will emerge. 
The unilateral path corresponds to the state depicted by Becker (1980). 
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4  UNILATERAL BEHAVIORS 
 
4.1  Unilateral behavior of a risk lover 
In this section, I examine the consequence if a risk lover chooses the unilateral path. Suppose that 
there are two economies that are identical except for DRA and that
21 0 εε  ; that is, economy 
1 is risk loving and economy 2 is risk averse.  
 First, suppose that the two economies are isolated, and there are no transactions between 
them. In this case, their growth rates are  
 
 















 θα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
,t
,t 111
1
1                           (7) 
 
and 
  
  















 θα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
,t
,t 112
2
2   . 
 
Because  
k
y
α
mν
α α
α







 
1

and   01 




 
θα
mν
α α
α

in an endogenously growing economy,  
 
0
1
1 
,t
,t
c
c
 
 
and 
 
  0
2
2 
,t
,t
c
c
 . 
 
Hence, whereas risk-averse economy 2 can grow on a balanced growth path, risk-loving economy 
1 will eventually cease to exist in the sense that 0lim 1 

,t
t
c . This result is the consequence that 
conventional economic theory proposes about risk lovers.  
 Next, suppose that the two economies are open to each other, and goods and services 
and capital can move smoothly between them, but labor is immobilized. Because  
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




































θ
k
τ
k
dsτ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
c
c
,t
t
t
,t
t
s
t
α
α
α
α
,t
,t
t
11
011
1
1
1 limlim11lim

      (8) 
 
(see Harashima, 2010, 2017), the consumption growth rate of economy 1 (
,t
,t
t c
c
1
1lim


) can be 
constant only if either 
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t
t
t
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t c
c
ds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlim















                   (9) 
 
or 
 
  α
α
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
α
mν
α
ds
dt
dsd

















1
0
0
1limlim





  .             (10) 
 
Conversely, economy 1 has two paths on which
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim


is constant. Equation (9) indicates the 
path on which 
 


t
t
t k
τ
,1
lim constant, 
 
and equation (10) indicates the path on which 
 
  1lim1
1
1















t
t
t
α
α
τ
τ
α
mν
α 
 
 
for any 
t
t
t k
τ
,1
lim

.  
 Equation (9) corresponds to the multilateral path that will be examined in detail in 
Section 5. Equation (10) corresponds to the unilateral path, because if economy 1 behaves 
unilaterally and sets
tτ independently of economy 2’s optimality conditions, then tτ is a control 
variable in addition to ct for economy 1. Therefore, the optimality condition  
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is added to the optimality conditions of economy 1. If equation (11) (i.e., the unilateral path 
condition) is held, equation (10) is satisfied. Therefore, equation (10) corresponds to the unilateral 
path.  
 By equation (8), if economy 1 chooses the unilateral path that equations (10) and (11) 
indicate, the growth rate is 
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Because 01 ε  and because   01 




 
θα
mν
α α
α

in an endogenously growing economy, by 
equation (12), 
  0lim
,1
,1


t
t
t c
c
 . 
 
Therefore, if risk-loving economy 1 behaves unilaterally and chooses the unilateral path, it will 
eventually perish in the sense that 0lim 1 

,t
t
c . 
 
4.2  Unilateral behavior of a risk-averse household 
As with risk-loving economy 1, risk-averse economy 2 can satisfy all of its optimality conditions 
on the multilateral path, but what will happen when economy 2 chooses the unilateral path? 
Because  
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(see Harashima, 2010, 2017), the consumption growth rate of economy 2 can be constant only if 
either 
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or 
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Equation (13) indicates the multilateral path (sustainable heterogeneity). Similar to the unilateral 
behavior of economy 1, if economy 2 behaves unilaterally, equation (11) has to be added as an 
optimality condition of economy 2. In this case, economy 2 grows on the path such that   
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thereby satisfying all optimality conditions of economy 2. The path indicated by equation (15) is 
identical to the path that satisfies equation (14). That is, equation (14) corresponds to the unilateral 
path. Note that equation (14) is identical to equation (10) for economy 1.  
On the unilateral path of economy 2 indicated by equations (14) and (15), 
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Here, 
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(see Harashima, 2010, 2017), and 
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is required because   α
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  on the unilateral path by equation (14). 
However, because
t
t
t
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t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
lim0lim


 on the unilateral path, economy 1 must initially set 
consumption such that 01,c , which violates its optimality condition. Hence, on the unilateral 
path of economy 2, economy 2 can satisfy its all optimality conditions but economy 1 cannot.  
 
 
5  ECONOMICALLY SURVIVABLE RISK LOVING 
 
5.1  Sustainable heterogeneity with risk lovers 
As shown in Section 4, risk-loving economy 1 can satisfy all its optimality conditions only on the 
path indicated by equation (9). In this section, this path (i.e., the multilateral path) is examined in 
detail. By equation (8), for economy 1 to grow at a positive rate (i.e., 0lim
1
1 

,t
,t
t c
c
),  
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        (16) 
 
needs to be satisfied. As shown in Section 4, if economy 1 chooses the unilateral path, equation 
(16) cannot be satisfied. However, if economy 1 chooses the multilateral path indicated by 
equation (9), another possibility emerges. On the multilateral path, 
,t
,t
t c
c
1
1lim


= constant and  
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is satisfied for an appropriate constant value T. Because
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then  
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by equation (17). Therefore, if an appropriate value of T is realized, economy 1 can grow at a 
positive constant rate; that is, it is sustainable.  
 Here, if economy 2 satisfies equation (13) as economy 1 simultaneously satisfies 
equation (9),  
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because by equations (9) and (13), 
 
  
t
t
t
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
ds
dt
dsd
,2
,2
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlimlim















 . 
 
Both economies grow at a common growth rate, indicated by equation (5), with an appropriate 
value of T.  
 Equation (5) indicates that, if 210 εε  , 0limlim
,2
,2
,1
,1


t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c 
 and both economies can 
grow at an identical positive rate. That is, if 210 εε  , sustainable heterogeneity can be achieved. 
If risk-loving economy 1 and risk-averse economy 2 jointly proceed on a multilateral path, 
economy 1 can exist indefinitely even though it is risk loving. Furthermore, in the multi-economy 
model, if equation (6) is satisfied and if 


H
q
qε
1
0 , sustainable heterogeneity is also achieved. 
That is, a sufficiently large number of risk-loving people can exist indefinitely. Note, however, if 
021  εε  or 0
1


H
q
qε , all economies perish on the multilateral path. 
 
5.2  Characteristics of sustainable heterogeneity with risk lovers 
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As shown in Section 3.2, on the multilateral path with 210 εε  , 0Ξ  if  
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 is generally satisfied for reasonable 
parameter values unless
2
21 εε  is close to zero. Inequality 0Ξ  on the multilateral path with 
210 εε  means that risk-loving economy 1 continues to borrow money from risk-averse 
economy 2 indefinitely. Because the current account of economy 1 is negative, economy 1 owes 
debts to economy 2 indefinitely. Note thatΞ is constant on this multilateral path, so the debt level 
does not explode.  
 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved,  
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Hence, a higher
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 indicates a higher
t
t
t A
A
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lim . To achieve a higher
t
t
t A
A

lim , a 
larger amount of investment in At is necessary. As (positive) DRA (ε) approaches zero, an 
economy invests more in At, and the growth rate of consumption increases, but as DRA (ε) 
becomes negative, investment in At, increases such that consumption has to continuously decline 
to zero. However, if both risk-averse and risk-loving economies exist and the risk-loving economy 
can borrow money from the risk-averse economy appropriately and indefinitely, the consumption 
of the risk-loving economy does not decline to zero and can be sustained. This is the mechanism 
behind inequality 0Ξ . Sustainable heterogeneity therefore means risk-loving economy 1 owes 
appropriate and indefinite debts to risk-averse economy 2.  
 
5.3  The choice of risk-averse economy 
5.3.1  The best choice  
Risk-loving economy 1 can achieve sustainable heterogeneity on the multilateral path, but does 
risk-averse economy 2 choose the multilateral path rather than the unilateral path? Unlike 
economy 1, economy 2 can satisfy its all optimality conditions on either path, but which path is 
best?   
 Suppose 210 εε  . The growth rate of economy 2 on the multilateral path is indicated 
by equation (5), and the rate on the unilateral path is indicated by equation (15). The growth rate 
on the multilateral path is clearly higher than that on the unilateral path because
2
21
2
0 ε
εε


 . 
Considering this nature, it is highly likely that economy 2 prefers the multilateral path to the 
unilateral path as long as 210 εε  is satisfied. Economy 2 can enjoy a higher growth rate 
because of the existence of risk lovers. In other words, risk-averse economy 2 can exploit the 
opportunities that the existence of risk-loving economy 1 provides because economy 2 is better 
off appropriately lending money to economy 1. The multilateral path will therefore be favorable 
to both economies as long as 210 εε  is held. 
 
5.3.2  Behavior of a household with a DRA is close to zero 
More generally, in the multi-economy model, the multilateral path is favorable for most 
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economies by equation (6) as long as 


H
q
qε
1
0 is held. However, in the multi-economy model, 
the multilateral path may not be favorable for economies with DRAs that are positive but close to 
zero, because the growth rates of these economies are higher on the unilateral path than they are 
on the multilateral path. By equation (7), as (positive) DRA approaches zero, the growth rate 
becomes extremely high and increases to infinity.  
 However, many of these economies will also choose the multilateral path because it 
seems likely that the DRA has the property of a Markov process. In this paper and in many 
economic studies, an infinitely long-lived household is assumed, which means there is a “dynasty” 
that consists of all its future generations. Some future generations in a dynasty may be relatively 
more risk averse and others may be less risk averse or even rather risk loving. This means that the 
DRA of a dynasty will possess the property of a Markov chain. If a state in this chain has a 
negative DRA, the dynasty may cease to exist during that period unless sustainable heterogeneity 
is formed with risk-averse dynasties. The states of a Markov chain of a dynasty with a positive 
near-zero expected DRA will generally include states with a negative DRA—that is, periods of 
risk loving. Therefore, dynasties with positive near-zero expected DRAs will generally behave in 
the same manner as risk lovers and choose the multilateral path.  
 Furthermore, even if some of these dynasties still behave unilaterally in periods of 
positive DRAs, the entire economy will still eventually proceed on the multilateral path, because 
when these dynasties’ states change to a negative DRA they have to choose the multilateral path 
and reset their levels of consumption to be consistent with it. Transitions to states of negative 
DRAs will occur repeatedly in future generations, and on all such occasions the levels of 
consumption have to be reset to be consistent with the multilateral path. This means that these 
dynasties follow the multilateral path in the long run. Moreover, if these dynasties behave 
unilaterally, many other risk-averse dynasties will politically resist their unilateral behavior and 
governing authorities will intervene so as to achieve sustainable heterogeneity by constraining 
their unilateral behaviors (see Harashima, 2010, 2012, 2017). As a result, the entire economy will 
eventually proceed on the multilateral path even if some dynasties with positive but near-zero 
expected DRAs exist.  
 
5.4  Degree of risk loving and number of risk lovers 
If not only the DRA of an individual dynasty but the DRA of the combined economy (i.e., 
economies that commonly proceed on the multilateral path) is positive but close to zero (i.e., 
0
1
1 


H
q
qεH for 


H
q
qεH
1
1 ), is the multilateral path still favorable for all economies? By 
equation (6), as 


H
q
qεH
1
1 approaches zero, the growth rate of the combined economy becomes 
extremely high and increases to infinity. However, an almost infinitely high growth rate seems 
quite unnatural. Therefore, in actuality, 


H
q
qεH
1
1 will be sufficiently distant from zero. This 
means that there exists an upper bound of the degree of risk loving among households and, in 
addition, an upper bound of the number of risk-loving households in a society. Hence, it seems 
likely that highly risk-loving people are a small minority in a society. 
 The reason for the existence of the upper bounds is that 


H
q
qεH
1
1 will have the same 
property as the DRA of an individual household in that it will also have the property of a Markov 
chain. If 


H
q
qεH
1
1 consists of states that include negative values, the combined economy will 
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cease to exist in periods of negative 


H
q
qεH
1
1 . As a result, 


H
q
qεH
1
1 will not consist of any state 
that includes negative values, and therefore the expected 


H
q
qεH
1
1 (i.e., the mean of 


H
q
qεH
1
1 ) 
will be sufficiently distant from zero.  
 
5.5  Usefulness of risk lovers 
Because of sustainable heterogeneity, risk lovers are useful for, and welcome in, a society unless 
their number and their degree of risk loving are too great. Suppose that the DRAs of H households 
in a country are heterogeneous and distributed uniformly between ψε  and ψε  , where ψ is a 
positive constant. The average DRA of the country is therefore εεH
H
q
q 


1
1 . If there is no risk-
loving household in the country, ψε 0 and εεHψ
H
q
q  


1
1 . On the other hand, if risk-
loving households with 0 ψεψ exist continuously under sustainable heterogeneity, the 
average DRA ( εεH
H
q
q 


1
1 ) can be lower than when no risk-loving households exist; that is, 
ψεεH
H
q
q  


1
10 . Therefore, by equation (6), thanks to the existence of risk-loving 
households, the growth rate of the country is higher than when no risk-loving households exist, 
because of a lower εεH
H
q
q 


1
1 . In this sense, an adequate number of temperately risk-loving 
persons are useful for a society.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A bubble-like phenomenon (the so-called “bubble economy”) can be generated rationally by a 
bluff undertaken by risk lovers, but can risk lovers exist continuously in an economy? In 
conventional economic growth models, if a household’s DRA is negative, its consumption 
steadily declines to zero and it ceases to exist. Because of this nature, there have been few 
economic studies on risk lovers. In this paper, the possibility that risk lovers can exist 
continuously is examined in the framework of an economic growth model on the basis of the 
concept of sustainable heterogeneity, which is the state at which all optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. If risk-loving and risk-averse persons coexist 
at this state, risk lovers can exist continuously in an economy and a bluff can be undertaken.  
I conclude that risk lovers can exist continuously at the state of sustainable heterogeneity, 
although their number and degree of risk loving have an upper bound. Therefore, it is likely that 
a bluff will be undertaken by risk lovers and that a bubble-like phenomenon can be generated.  
Although risk lovers bluff, it is the bluff that deserves blame from a social perspective, 
not their risk-loving nature, which is not necessarily bad for society. Of course, a gambling 
addiction is socially unacceptable, but moderately risk-loving people may be socially desirable as 
long as their number is not too great (i.e., as long as 


H
q
qεH
1
1 has a sufficiently large positive 
value), because they contribute to a relatively high growth rate of an economy that consists of 
heterogeneous households.   
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